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Abstract This paper studies how voting rules affect the ease with which deci-
sions are made, basing the analysis on the key premise that ideology makes some 
coalitions more likely to form than others. Our study focuses on the Council of the 
European Union (EU), where member states hold different voting weights and ideo-
logical positions are strongly linked to the affiliation of actors to political parties. 
Accordingly, to explore the influence of ideology on the probability of coalition 
formation, and to thus formulate a ‘decision probability’, we incorporate ideologi-
cal positions in the analysis of efficiency of the voting system. For the case of the 
EU, we particularly consider the transition from the triple-majority voting system of 
the Nice Treaty to the double-majority system incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty. 
The standard assumption that member states vote independently and affirmatively 
with a probability of 0.5 leads to a more pessimistic view of the Council’s decision-
making capacity than does the premise that member state votes are biased towards 
voting with the Council majority. The latter assumption is supported by voting data 
and anecdotal evidence on the ‘consensus-seeking’ culture in the Council. Hence, 
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this paper offers some insights into the ‘efficiency’ of the decision-making pro-
cess, given institutional voting rules, in combination with actual actor ideological 
positions.
Keywords Council of the EU · Nice Treaty · Lisbon Treaty · Power to act · 
Probability of coalition formation
JEL Classification C71 · D72
1 Introduction
How does the choice of decision rules affect the ‘capacity to act’ of an institution? 
How strong is the status quo bias inherent in different voting rules? The majority of 
studies on decision-making processes in the EU focus on the relative influence of 
actors and institutions in the EU’s inter-institutional setup, either basing the analy-
sis on cooperative game theory and notably voting power analysis, or using exten-
sive form games combined with spatial voting analysis (or a combination of these 
approaches).1 This paper studies effects of voting rules in the Council of the EU over 
time and aims to explore how the theoretical probability that ‘winning coalitions’ 
form in this institution is affected by knowledge on actor’s ideological positions. 
Hence, the size of the institution, changes in voting rules and (empirical) informa-
tion on the position of Council actors in terms of locations on important policy 
dimensions are assumed to determine the ease with which decisions can be taken in 
practice and hence, the extent of the institution’s status quo bias.
The standard approach to measuring the efficiency of a voting body is to compute 
the probability of it passing a motion. This probability indicates the ability of the 
voting body to act, or the extent of status quo bias. While the probability of pass-
ing a motion depends on the voting behavior as well as voting rules, the standard 
approach focuses exclusively on the role of voting rules. Accordingly, the standard 
tool for measuring the efficiency of a voting body is the 1971 Coleman measure on 
the power of a collectivity to act. Defined as the ratio of the number of winning coa-
litions to the total number of all conceivable coalitions, the Coleman measure equals 
the probability of a decision in favor of a change in the status quo, provided that 
all coalitions are equally probable.2 This assumption is equivalent to the binomial 
model of voting in which each vote has an equal probability of being for or against 
1  See, for example, Tsebelis (1994, 1995), Steunenberg (1994), Crombez (1996), Garrett and Tsebelis 
(1996, 1999), Moser (1996, 1997), Laruelle (1997), Hubschmid and Moser (1997), Thomson and Hosli 
(2006), and Napel and Widgrén (2006).
2  By ‘coalition’ we mean the set of members voting affirmatively, i.e. against the status quo, in accord-
ance with standard terminology in the literature on voting power and voting procedures (Felsenthal and 
Machover 1998).
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a motion and all votes are independent; also known as the ‘Independent Coalition 
Culture’ (ICC). The binomial model is a rational starting point in the absence of 
prior information on the member states’ preferences concerning the ballot issues. 
It is the benchmark model used in constitutional design (Felsenthal and Machover 
2004).
The critics of the power measurement argue that the standard analysis ignores 
the preferences of voters.3 The relative ease of making decisions will, without any 
doubt, depend on the distribution of preferences among the relevant actors. Selck 
(2005) uses this point to explain the relative lack of inertia in Council decision-
making. According to Selck, a clear desire to overcome the status quo exists in EU 
decision-making, which explains why decisions are still being made despite the pre-
viously discussed institutional inertia. In other words, preference homogeneity exists 
among EU decision makers. But there are other reasons for a possible inherent theo-
retical status quo bias in Council decision-making. First, recent EU enlargements 
have likely increased the heterogeneity of preferences among the member states in 
the Council while decreasing the pace of decision-making. Second, the possibility 
of a bloc by a coalition comprising only four member states (under the current Lis-
bon voting rules) might hamper more important changes that truly alter the status 
quo, while at the same time preference homogeneity on a host of smaller, technical 
issues might create a false sense of progress.
An empirically informed analysis of voting in the Council is hampered by the 
fact that most decisions are reached ‘behind closed doors’. Since 1993, transparency 
has somewhat increased through the publication of voting records.4 The relative fre-
quency of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ votes in this data refutes the assumption of equally prob-
able voting outcomes and therefore challenges the binomial model of equally prob-
able and independent votes. Voting data reveals that divisions typically occur with 
very different frequencies, and that votes of the member states are highly positively 
correlated. In sum, there is a strong case for a ‘culture of consensus’ in the Council 
(Hix 1999, Sherrington 2000, Hayes-Renshaw et al. 2006, Hosli 2007). Dissenting 
votes, as well as abstentions, seem to serve the purpose of scoring points ‘at home’, 
i.e. demonstrating opposition as a strategy in domestic politics. This also implies 
that, in practice, member states are biased towards voting ‘yes’ in the Council.
Unlike voting rules, which are formally provided for in the treaties of the EU, 
the future motions and how divided over them the Council will be cannot be fore-
seen. Our point of departure is the assumption that ideological factors make some 
coalitions more likely than others regardless of the actual issue at stake, and that 
some issues are more controversial than others. We propose to model the underly-
ing common tendencies among groups (blocs) of member states using the correla-
tion between their votes as the simplest and most widely used measure of stochastic 
dependence. In this model,
3  See Napel and Widgrén (2004) and the critique in Braham and Holler (2005a), as well as the reply in 
Napel and Widgrén (2005) and the rejoinder in Braham and Holler (2005b).
4  See Daniel Naurin’s web page of Council voting data, available at http://www.counc ildat a.cergu .gu.
se/.
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1. the degree of acceptance of an issue by a single member state is captured using 
the marginal probability of an affirmative vote, and
2. the correlation matrix between the affirmative votes reflects commonalities in the 
preference of the member states that exist regardless of the actual issue on ballot.
The standard binomial model of voting assumes a marginal probability of 0.5 and 
zero correlations. In the standard model each state flips a fair coin, and all such flips 
are independent of each other. In our model, by comparison, each member state flips 
a ‘biased coin’, where the bias may depend on the issue on ballot, and all such flips 
are correlated according to the ideological positions of the member states.
In the past two decades the EU has experienced dramatic changes, the most sali-
ent being its increase in membership from fifteen to twenty-eight member states. 
Clearly, enlarged membership increases the risk of ‘deadlock’ in the Council.5 Not 
only does the unanimity rule increase a committee’s status quo bias as membership 
grows by introducing more ‘veto players’,6 but a similar effect materialized in the 
framework of the Nice triple-majority rule and may, although to a lesser extent, be 
inherent in the more recent double-majority clause introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. 
Hence, if member state voting moves towards a probability of voting ‘yes’ of one 
half, and if the current percentage of the vote total needed to reach decisions in 
the Council is not lowered, the recent enlargements are indeed likely to lead to an 
increase in the EU’s propensity to revert to the status quo. We show however, that 
if EU member states continue to adhere to the ‘consensus culture’ in the Council, 
the status quo bias will decrease significantly and in practice, ‘decision-making effi-
ciency’ will be higher than the ‘raw’ assessments of decision efficiency, based on 
voting rules and the ICC assumption, suggest.
This paper offers an in-depth discussion of the evolution of voting rules in the 
Council, combining the insights from the contemporary political science research on 
the functioning of the Council with theory of power measurement. Power computa-
tions provided in the paper illustrate how different assumptions about the level of 
consensus among the member states influence the probability of a collective deci-
sion. The degree of consensus among the member states can be modeled using the 
probability of acceptance, or using the correlations between the votes. The correla-
tion matrix offers a particularly flexible way of accounting for heterogeneity among 
the member states that is driven, for example, by ideological differences, or by the 
realities of their countries. We discuss both modeling approaches to modeling the 
degree of consensus.
The next section describes how the present paper approaches the problem of 
assessing voting efficiency, or the inherent status quo bias of an institution. The defi-
nition of voting blocs and the construction of the corresponding correlation matrices 
are discussed in Sect. 3. Section 4 applies this analysis to the Council of the EU and 
Sect. 5 summarizes our results and conclusions.
6  See, for example, Tsebelis (1995).
5  For an early analysis of this issue, see König and Bräuninger (1997, 1998).
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2  Winning Coalitions and the Analysis of Decision Efficiency
Even before the introduction of the Nice Treaty voting rules on November 1st, 2004, 
most authors found the EU’s capacity to act to be rather limited. In a spatial anal-
ysis of EU decision-making, Crombez (1996) found that certain institutional ele-
ments fostered ‘indecision’ in the EU and proposed adopting the simple majority 
rule in the Council to alleviate this inherent inflexibility in the EU’s procedures. 
Similarly, resorting to simple majority had been advocated early on by Lane and 
Maeland (1995) and by Peters (1996). The issue of status quo bias has also been 
addressed in studies using more empirical materials. Golub (1998) and König and 
Bräuninger (1998), for example, both analyzed the ‘swiftness’ of decision-making 
in the history of the EU. Golub found, contra conceived wisdom, that the quickness 
of decision-making was quite reasonable in the early EU—for which ‘Eurosclerosis’ 
is usually diagnosed—compared to the 1980s and 1990s, and that it had not slowed 
down after the 1995 enlargement (Golub 2002). By contrast, König and Bräuninger 
(1998) found that the pace of decision-making appeared to be slowing down over 
time, not least since the European Parliament’s leverage increased. This finding was 
supported in Schulz and König (2000) and by König and Bräuninger (2002). Sloot 
and Verschuren (1990), an earlier study in this tradition, found that the introduction 
of the cooperation procedure in the mid-1980s with the ratification of the Single 
European Act (SEA) had a positive effect on the swiftness of decision-making by 
increasing the use of qualified majority voting (QMV) instead of unanimity in the 
Council. Hence, the general thrust of these studies suggests that QMV has facilitated 
decision-making in the EU.
Matters have obviously been complicated by the decision-making rules incorpo-
rated in the Nice Treaty of December 2000, and the subsequent accession of twelve 
new members. Baldwin and Widgrén (2004) provided evidence of the Council’s 
declined ability to act as a result. They pointed out that the rules provided in the 
Nice Treaty are “so flawed that EU leaders asked to reform them before they were 
even implemented” (p. 7). A study by Leech (2002) concurrently found that the high 
decision-making thresholds (both before and after the Treaty of Nice) have rendered 
EU decision-making decidedly rigid. Empirical studies nonetheless claim that the 
general pace of decision-making in the Council has not significantly decreased, even 
after the 2004 enlargement (Golub 2007; Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse 2007).
To assess the EU Council’s inherent ‘efficiency’ of decision-making, or the extent 
of status quo bias, we model the probability of the occurrence of winning coali-
tions. Traditionally, this approach assumes the binomial model of voting, implying 
that each coalition is equally likely to form.7 As the assumptions of the binomial 
model do not hold, Coleman’s original measure—defined as the ratio of winning 
coalitions in the total number of conceivable coalitions—cannot accurately reflect 
7  This approach has been used, for example, by Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Coleman (1971, 1973), 
Kilgour and Levesque (1984), Peters (1996b), König and Bräuninger (1997, 1998, 2002), Baldwin et al. 
(2001), Leech (2002), Baldwin and Widgrén (2004), Hosli and Machover (2004), and Plechanovová 
(2004).
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the probability of a decision being reached in practice whereas it of course is still 
correct in an ex ante, constitutional perspective. To account for the similarity of 
members’ preferences, or the strength of the consensus-seeking culture within the 
Council, we need to change the underlying probabilistic assumptions.
Such a change is feasible because the Coleman measure is a compound meas-
ure that takes into account the calculus of coalitions implied in the formal voting 
rules, as well as the likelihood of their occurrence. Coalitions that are winning under 
equally probable and independent votes continue to win when the votes lose either 
property, what changes, however, are the probabilities of their occurrence. This fact 
is important because it allows the properties of the voting rule to be studied sepa-
rately from those of the probability model. Changing the voting rules by assigning 
different weights to the members of a voting body, or changing the decision quota, 
will likely alter the set of winning coalitions, but not the probability distribution on 
the set of all coalitions.
In the simplest case, a voting rule in a weighted voting game is given by the num-
ber of votes each member of the voting body commands and the fraction of the total 
number of votes required to pass a motion. The voting rules of the EU, however, 
are more complex. The set of winning coalitions under complex voting rules such 
as the triple-majority rule introduced by the Nice Treaty, or the double-majority 
rule with a blocking minority requirement of the Lisbon Treaty, can only be evalu-
ated by directly testing each conceivable configuration of votes. This is because the 
so defined voting game is not a ‘weighted voting game’ according to the standard 
definition used in cooperative game theory (Felsenthal and Machover 1998, ch. 2). 
Using the language of Boolean functions, the binary function jointly defined by the 
voting rules is not a linear threshold function (Crama and Hammer 2011, ch. 9). 
This leads direct enumeration to be the only feasible way of certifying which coali-
tions are winning and which ones are losing. The computational study by Kurz and 
Napel (2016) shows that dimension of the Lisbon voting system is at least seven, i.e. 
a combination of at least seven weighted voting games is needed to obtain the set of 
winning coalitions under the Lisbon voting system.
The modeling approach described above has been proposed and developed in 
Kaniovski (2008) and Kaniovski and Das (2015). It allows calibrating an accurate 
model of the voting body given one’s prior beliefs about the preferences of the 
members and the degree of commonality or rivalry among them. Expressed in terms 
of the correlation coefficients, these beliefs can be used to forecast the probabilities 
of different voting outcomes, and hence the probability of a voting body as a whole 
passing a motion. This probability then reflects the power of a collectivity to act, or 
the efficiency of the voting body—in our case, the Council of the EU.
Computing the above-mentioned probability requires a joint probability distribu-
tion on the set of voting outcomes. Individual probabilities of an affirmative vote and 
second-order correlation coefficients between pairs of such votes do not uniquely 
define a joint probability distribution. Bahadur (1961) has provided a general solu-
tion to the aggregation problem of finding a joint probability distribution with given 
marginal probabilities and correlation coefficients in terms of higher-order corre-
lation coefficients. The difficulty in applying his result, however, lies in the exces-
sively large number of required parameters.
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Regularization offers a practical solution to the aggregation problem. It imposes 
additional criteria on the solution for it to have certain properties; in our case this is 
uniqueness. We use ‘constrained quadratic optimization’ to find a particular solu-
tion, i.e. a joint probability distribution satisfying given marginal probabilities of 
affirmative votes and a given correlation matrix between them. This particular solu-
tion is closest, in the sense of having the smallest sum of squared deviations, to the 
joint probability distribution in the baseline case of independent votes. Solving the 
most general optimization problem—with arbitrary marginal probabilities and sec-
ond-order correlation coefficients—requires numerical optimization.
Calibrating the model for 27 EU member states would require at least 352 param-
eters to generate a joint probability distribution over the 134,217,728 conceivable 
voting outcomes, or coalitions. With the current 28 member states, by compari-
son, the number of coalitions in fact doubles, and the minimal number of param-
eters increases to 379. To reduce this computational complexity, we are grouping 
the member states into homogenous voting blocs, comparable to the approach used 
by Kirman and Widgrén (1995). The efficiency calculations are then performed 
using the voting blocs rather than individual member states, although a voting bloc 
may comprise a single state. This is no ideal way of ‘clustering’ member states into 
blocs, but given the circumstances, it is the most reasonable way to go about. EU 
member states are very likely to be influenced in their voting behavior by the politi-
cal party affiliation of their highest ranked government officials. The number and 
composition of the voting blocs in our study will hence be determined by ‘Ideologi-
cal Scores’ (see below). The voting weight of a voting bloc then simply is the sum of 
the votes its members command.
3  Actor Preferences and Alignments in the Council of the EU
Given the strong influence of party politics on the structure of the EU political 
space, notably due to the strengthening of the role of the European Parliament (EP) 
over time, it can be assumed that the political location of an actor’s party matters 
in decision-making. That applies also to a primarily intergovernmental institution 
such as the Council of the EU. Recent institutional changes have more explicitly 
connected results of the EP elections to the political profile of the European Com-
mission and with this, contribute to politicization of the EU’s legislative process. 
The Council, the ultimate decision-maker on EU legislation, is inevitably part of 
this process, as was established already a while ago (Hagemann and Høyland 2008), 
even more so with the broadening scope of the co-decision procedure and qualified 
majority voting introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. The changes to the decision-mak-
ing rule for the Council, officially applicable since November 2014, may also further 
this trend.
Therefore, to identify the most probable groups that may have a potential to form 
coalitions within the Council of the EU, we use data on positions of the party groups 
in the EP, based on a survey carried out in 2010 (McElroy and Benoit 2012). The 
EP party groups overarch the broad spectrum of national political parties that form 
the governments in EU member states, while at the same time have the potential 
38 Homo Oecon (2018) 35:31–52
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to facilitate the coordination of actions of those involved in the legislative process 
across the EU’s institutions. We do not claim this is always the case, but since most 
EU legislation requires approval of the EP and we see a high coherence of party 
groups’ voting in the EP (Hix and Høyland 2013), using the party family affiliation 
for EU governments seems a sensible approach to take.
We believe that, in the long run, the overall position of the government of an 
EU member state may be defined by the affiliation of the Prime Minister of this 
government to the respective EP party group. Most EU states, however, have coali-
tion governments and therefore the Prime Minister and the minister responsible for 
a particular policy area may be affiliated with different political parties. We hence 
assume that should they disagree on individual pieces of legislation, the position of 
the Prime Minister will usually prevail or that the position will be within the inter-
val of ‘tolerance’ of the party leading the coalition—that is, the positions that the 
leading party will still accept. We are aware this assumption is somewhat arbitrary, 
but we believe that its foundation is sound. First, results of the empirical research 
on coalition formation in the Council of the EU does not provide any alternative 
clear-cut pattern that would describe long-term coalition behavior of the members of 
the Council of the EU based on distinct substantive preferences. The patterns iden-
tified in the literature, e.g. North–South (e.g. Mattila 2004) or North–South–East 
(Naurin and Lindahl 2008) or core-periphery (Plechanovová 2011) or a rich-poor 
divide (Bailer et al. 2015) point either to closeness of the political culture or to the 
behavioral pattern under given power constellations of the members in the Council. 
Second, following the previous argument, final decisions in the EU Council remain 
highly consensual, indicating that the tendency towards the highest possible support 
of the EU legislation persists. Given the broader context of the legislative process in 
the interaction with the European Commission and the European Parliament, both 
institutions with a clear political profile, the assumption of the political party lead-
ing the member state’s government providing the political identity of the member of 
the Council as an actor seems fully consistent with the hypothesis of the correlated 
votes we are using for our analysis.
Consequently, we take the average positions of the EP party groups with which 
the Prime Ministers of member states were affiliated during the last legislative 
term, from mid-2009 to mid-2014. The mean values are taken on two dimensions. 
The first dimension is the traditional ideological left–right positioning, reflect-
ing the general attitude of an actor to socio-economic policies in relation to other 
actors in a comparative perspective (Benoit and Laver 2006). The second dimen-
sion is an actor’s attitude as to whether the EU should develop into a ‘federa-
tion’ or stay a ‘Europe of nation-states’. Both dimensions are assessed on a scale 
ranging from 0 to 20 (see Fig. 1). The distributions of the party groups’ positions 
along the left–right spectrum and the future integration dimension however, fol-
low diverse trajectories.8 Given the fact that during the EP’s last legislative term 
8 On the relation of the left–right positioning and support for EU integration dimensions, notably see 
Hooghe et al. (2002).
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five party groups have headed the governments of the EU’s member states, we 
used the k-means clustering of the left–right positions to place the member states 
into groups. The main objective of any clustering technique is to obtain groups 
with a maximum homogeneity within and a maximum heterogeneity between 
them. The number of clusters has been determined using the usual analysis of the 
reduction in the within group sum of squared deviations. Figure 2 shows that the 
optimal number of clusters is between 4 and 5. These groups of member states 
are treated as voting blocs in the subsequent analysis. The ideological position of 
a voting bloc is given by the mean ideological position of its members.
When trying to proceed in a similar manner on the EU integration dimension 
we find that the variance of the positions of a large majority of EU governments 
is very low, making the assumption of the same number of distinctive voting 
blocs along this dimension unreasonable.
The score of a voting bloc then is the average score of its constituent member 
states (Table 1). Since a member of a voting bloc votes in unison with all other 
members, their number, as well as their voting and population weights, add to 
the weight of the bloc. On the level of voting blocs, we need a joint probability 
distribution on the set of 32 conceivable coalitions between the five voting blocs. 
To construct a correlation matrix between the affirmative votes of the blocs, we 
Fig. 1  Positions of party groups on the left–right and federalization dimensions
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take the cross product between the normalized average scores to compute the off-
diagonal elements of the correlation matrix, while the diagonal elements are set 
to unity. Using this simple procedure, we arrive at the correlation matrices shown 
in Table 2. The matrices give us a choice of positive correlations that range from 
close to zero to close to one half. These Pearson product-moment correlation 
coefficients easily fulfill the consistency conditions discussed in Bahadur (1961) 
and in Kaniovski and Zaigraev (2011), so that a distribution consistent with cor-
relation matrices shown in Table 2 exists. 
Figure 3 shows the joint probability distributions consistent with the correla-
tion matrix based on Ideology Scores for several values of the acceptance prob-
ability, or the marginal probability of an affirmative vote by a bloc. The bars show 
Table 1  Composition of voting blocs based on ideology and federalization
Size Weight Population Ideology score Feder-
alization 
score
Voting blocs–ideology dimension
 1 AT CY 2 14 9.3 6.9 9.8
 2 BE DK ES FR GR PT RO SI SK 9 124 177.6 10.6 7.7
 3 BG EE IT LT MT NL 6 66 89.1 12.0 7.3
 4 DE FI HU IE LU LV PL SE 8 100 152.5 13.4 7.8
 5 CZ GB 2 41 74.2 15.3 16.3
Voting blocs–EU federation dimension
 1 DK EE NL 3 24 23.7 11.4 6.5
 2 AT IE 2 17 13 10.4 7.4
 3 BE BG ES FI FR GR IT LT MT PT RO 
SK
12 169 246.4 11.3 7.7
 4 DE HU LU LV PL SE SI 7 90 144.5 13.0 8.0
 5 CY CZ GB 3 45 75.1 12.2 14.9
Table 2  Correlations between voting blocs based on ideology and federalization
Bloc 1 Bloc 2 Bloc 3 Bloc 4 Bloc 5
Bloc 1 1 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.27
Bloc 2 1 0.32 0.35 0.40
Bloc 3 1 0.40 0.46
Bloc 4 1 0.51
Bloc 5 1
Bloc 1 Bloc 2 Bloc 3 Bloc 4 Bloc 5
Bloc 1 1 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.40
Bloc 2 1 0.14 0.15 0.31
Bloc 3 1 0.14 0.30
Bloc 4 1 0.32
Bloc 5 1
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the probabilities of the occurrence of coalitions, sorted in descending order of 
decimals that their binary vectors represent. The left-most coalition is a grand 
coalition in favor (1,1,1,1,1)—or a unanimous ‘yes’—whereas the right-most coa-
lition is the grand coalition against (0,0,0,0,0), or an unanimous ‘no’.
The top left panel shows the distribution in the benchmark case of equally prob-
able and independent (uncorrelated) votes, based on the assumptions of the binomial 
model of voting, or ICC. Under these assumptions, all coalitions are equally likely to 
form. Changing the marginal probability of an affirmative vote and introducing posi-
tive correlations alters the distribution: increasing the marginal probability increases 
the probability of occurrence of all divisions with a high proportion of affirmative 
votes. On the other hand, positive correlation makes all broad coalitions more prob-
able, including those with a high proportion of negative votes, and makes all tight 
coalitions less probable. Broad coalitions represent divisions with a high degree of 
consensus or unanimity.
4  The Capacity of the Council to Act: Nice and Lisbon Treaty 
Provisions Incorporating Adapted Vote Probabilities
The EU comprises of twenty-eight member states in total. According to the Nice 
Treaty—signed on the 26th of February 2001, and in force since February 1st, 
2003—QMV in the Council required 260 out of the total of 352 votes to pass a 
motion. Moreover, a Council decision required support from more than seventeen 
member states to pass, as well as support from states representing at least 62% of the 
EU population (315.9 million as of 2014). These three elements constitute the ‘triple 
majority requirement’ of the Nice Treaty. The share of weighted votes needed to 
attain a qualified majority is 73.9%. Before the Nice Treaty, the decision quota was 
always roughly 71% of the total number of votes. This quota has remained relatively 
stable throughout the history of the EU (Hosli 1993). Under the double-majority rule 
of the Lisbon Treaty—signed on December 13th, 2007, and in force since Novem-
ber 1st, 2014—a motion passes if supported by fifteen member states representing at 
least 65% of the EU population (331.2 million as of 2014), unless a blocking minor-
ity is formed. A blocking minority requires that either the majority condition or the 
population condition is not met, and the number of member states in opposition is 
larger than three. The blocking minority clause allows passing a motion despite fail-
ing the population condition. These provisions are summarized in Table 3.
Felsenthal and Machover (2001) show, however, that the Nice Treaty’s triple 
majority requirement was in fact superfluous (at least before the 2004 enlargement), 
as no winning coalition in the EU-15 could satisfy the first two requirements without 
being composed of a majority of EU member states (see also Algaba et al. 2003). We 
retain the second and third majority requirements as factors, as their relative effects 
might increase when the first majority requirement is altered, or when the Council is 
enlarged. We also account for the effect of blocking minorities in the voting rule of 
the Lisbon Treaty. Our calculations are thus exact, as they apply all criteria.
What do different voting procedures imply for the relative capacity of the Council 
to act? Table 4 gives an overview of the proportion of winning coalitions that could 
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be formed out of the EU member state total when QMV applied in the Council’s 
decision-making, in the context of the EU-15 following the 1995 enlargement, the 
EU-25 (since 2004), the EU-27 (since 2007) and the EU-28 (since 2013).
Coleman’s original measure of efficiency equals the share of the winning coali-
tions in the total number of coalitions. Table 4 shows that in the EU-15, this share was 
7.8 percent, but under the triple-majority framework of the Nice Treaty, it decreased 
with the enlargement of the EU to a mere 1.9 percent in the EU-28. In stark contrast, 
the double-majority rule stipulated by the Lisbon Treaty will significantly increase 
decision efficiency in the Council. Under the Lisbon Treaty provisions, decision effi-
ciency in the EU-28 will increase to 13.9 percent. The capacity of the EU-28 to act 
under the Lisbon Treaty would thus even exceed the level enjoyed by the EU-15 after 
the 1995 enlargement, despite having almost twice as many member states.
The above calculations reflect the effect of the voting rules on the ease of reach-
ing a decision. They are based on the assumption that each member state votes ‘yes’ 
independently with a probability of one half (the ICC assumption). Given empirical 
evidence on actual voting behavior in the Council, however, this assumption may 
not capture the reality of voting behavior in this institution. Although the number 
of ‘no’ votes and abstentions in the Council seems to have increased after the 2004 
EU enlargement (Plechanovová 2011), there still seems to be a strong bias to vote 
with the Council majority rather than to oppose it once a decision has actually been 
put up to a vote. We can easily enrich the above setting by factoring in the degree of 
support for the issue on ballot, reflected in the marginal probabilities of an affirma-
tive vote, and the preferences of the member states, based on their ideological posi-
tions and reflected in the correlation matrix (see the left panel of Table 2 above).
Calculations in Table  5 demonstrate how predictions regarding decision effi-
ciency change once EU member states are assumed to vote ‘yes’ with probabilities 
0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8 and 0.9, respectively. A higher probability of affirmative votes, 
reflecting a higher homogeneity of preferences among EU states, unambiguously 
increases the Council’s capacity to act in practice. It is important to emphasize that 
we still maintain the independence of the member states’ votes, an assumption that 
will be relaxed in the subsequent analysis of voting by blocs.
The first row of Table 5 presents the calculations when member states vote ‘yes’ on 
proposals with probability 0.5. Decision efficiency in the EU-28 is 0.02 under the Nice 
Treaty provisions and 0.14 according to the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. However, 
if EU member states have higher probabilities of accepting proposals in formal votes, 
for instance due to convergence of preferences after a lengthy negotiation process, the 
Council’s capacity to act clearly improves. For example, if the collective probability 
of voting ‘yes’ is 0.6, decision efficiency increases to 0.11 (Nice Treaty) and to 0.37 
(Lisbon Treaty) respectively. Gains in the Council’s capacity to act are still higher 
when member states approve proposals with a probability of 0.8. Empirically, at least 
in the pre-2004 stage, EU member states supported proposals in formal Council vot-
ing procedures with a probability of almost 0.98 (Hosli 2007). According to Table 5, 
even if the probability of affirmative votes in the post-2004 phase were 0.9, the Coun-
cil’s capacity to act, with these altered assumptions, would still amount to 0.98 (Nice 
Treaty) and 0.99 (Lisbon Treaty) with the EU of twenty-eight members.
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1 3
Decision efficiency depends on the number of winning coalitions and their prob-
ability of occurrence. The interplay of the two factors, however, is complex and can-
not be disentangled, especially when number of voters varies. For a fixed number 
of voters, the decision probability increases with the number of winning coalitions. 
The share of winning coalitions has decreased continuously till the introduction of 
the Lisbon voting rules, leading to steady decrease in decision efficiency for mod-
erate values of the probability of a ‘yes’ vote in Table 5. But for sufficiently high 
values of this probability, the effect of the changes in the voting rules on decision 
efficiency abates, as we would expect given that efficiency, being a probability, is 
bounded by unity from above.
Figure 4 provides a graphical overview of the effects of the decision rules when 
the probability of affirmative votes increases. Differences in decision efficiency are 
largest when probabilities of affirmative votes are close to 0.5. The increase in effi-
ciency associated with an increase in the common probability of an affirmative vote 
is highest for the EU-28 under the Nice Treaty. This is not surprising, since the effi-
ciency for the EU-28 under the Nice Treaty is lower than for the other three voting 
systems in the baseline case of p = 0.5, and yet the efficiency under any voting sys-
tem must be unity in the limiting case of p = 1: in this limiting case, the voting body 
arrives at a unanimous decision with certainty. This claim is clearly demonstrated in 
Fig. 4.
According to these calculations, should the Council’s ‘consensus culture’ con-
tinue to apply in the future, the probability of reaching decisions in formal Council 
Table 5  Probability of decision with 27 members as a function of p
Probability of 
voting ‘yes’
Maastricht 
EU-15
Nice EU-25 Nice EU-27 Nice EU-28 Lisbon EU-28
0.5 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.14
0.6 0.23 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.37
0.7 0.50 0.44 0.38 0.38 0.65
0.8 0.80 0.79 0.75 0.76 0.88
0.9 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.99
Table 4  Share of winning coalitions in the Council of the EU (Coleman’s Index of the capacity of a col-
lectivity to act)
Treaty Council size 
(EU states)
Total number of possible coalitions 
(interarrangements) among members
Number of 
winning coali-
tions
Share of winning 
coalitions in total 
(%)
Maastricht 15 32,768 2549 7.8
Nice 25 33,554,432 1,203,735 3.6
Nice 27 134,217,728 2,718,738 2.0
Nice 28 268,435,456 5,032,111 1.9
Lisbon 28 268,435,456 37,185,871 13.9
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votes would barely decrease when more members join the EU. However, increased 
membership will, without a doubt, lengthen the negotiation and bargaining process 
among the EU states before a proposal is put to a formal vote in the Council. After 
all, formal Council voting records only capture instances in which the Council has 
actually resorted to a vote, which is a minority of all cases (Hayes-Renshaw et al. 
2006). Decisions made by consensus will hence be the result of long bargaining pro-
cesses, both among the EU’s institutions—notably the Commission, the European 
Parliament and the Council—and the EU’s member states. Voting reflects only ‘the 
tip of the iceberg’ in Council decision-making.
Nonetheless, calculations in Table  5 and Fig.  4 may illustrate why there is an 
apparent contradiction between empirical insights into the speed of EU decision-
making (Golub 2002, 2007) and respective predictions of Council decision effi-
ciency (Baldwin et  al. 2001; Leech 2002; Baldwin and Widgrén 2004; Hosli and 
Machover 2004) based on the formal voting rules. The assumption of higher prob-
abilities of affirmative votes of EU states in Council voting procedures leads to a 
prediction of higher probabilities of the Council to act. Whilst these calculations are 
unable to capture the length and intensity of bargaining prior to the formal Council 
vote, they may explain why, in reality, in spite of fairly tedious decision rules, deci-
sion-making in the Council is still fairly swift, even in an EU of 28 member states.
The preference-based analysis introduces correlations of the affirmative votes in 
addition to varying marginal probabilities of affirmative votes. For computational 
simplicity and because of the constraints imposed by the data, the preference-based 
analysis in this paper is conducted for voting blocs. Since Ideology and Federaliza-
tion scores are available for the EU 27 (without Croatia who became a member in 
2013), we use population weights of 2012 for the 27 EU Member States. We include 
two variations of the Nice and Lisbon voting rules. The lower requirements (‘Nice 
14’ and ‘Lisbon 15’) are the usual requirements for the number of EU member states 
needed to pass a decision on the basis of the Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP), 
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in which the European Commission submits the initial proposal. These requirements 
have also been used in all previous computations. The higher requirements (‘Nice 
18’ and ‘Lisbon 20’), by comparison, correspond to the case when the Council votes 
on a proposal that was not initiated by the European Commission.
The case of equally probable and independent votes is again included as a bench-
mark (see the first row of Table 6). Our results hence indicate that there is a major 
difference between the efficiency calculations for Council decision-making both in 
case of the Nice and the Lisbon provisions when member state votes are assumed to 
be correlated. With votes of respective blocs correlated on the basis of shared ideol-
ogy (left–right positions), the efficiency of the decision-making increases by 14% 
points under the Nice rule, assuming equal probability of positive and negative votes 
being cast. By relaxing this equal probability assumption, the difference gradually 
declines to 4% points for the probability of a positive vote of p = 0.9. Looking for a 
similar effect of the ‘federalization’ dimension, we also find this difference, but it is 
significantly smaller. Assessing the results of the Lisbon rules, we find the highest 
growth of efficiency at 9% points under the assumption of independent votes of the 
blocs, with votes correlated along the left–right dimension. Correlated votes along 
the ‘federalization’ dimension again yield a significantly smaller difference com-
pared to the assumption of independent votes. Since the voting blocs are defined by 
the ‘ideology’ position of the EU governments, this result was to be expected.
Our findings point to two insights in terms of decision-making rules in the Coun-
cil of the EU. First, the assumption of uncorrelated voting and equal probability of 
the votes appears to offer a sound basis for the constitutional principles underlying 
Table 6  Probability of decision 
to act with 5 voting blocs Probability of voting ‘yes’
Nice 14 Nice 18 Lisbon 15 Lisbon 20
Independent votes
 0.5 0.19 0.19 0.31 0.16
 0.6 0.30 0.30 0.45 0.27
 0.7 0.45 0.45 0.59 0.42
 0.8 0.61 0.61 0.74 0.59
 0.9 0.80 0.80 0.88 0.79
Correlated votes based on ideology
 0.5 0.33 0.33 0.40 0.31
 0.6 0.44 0.44 0.52 0.42
 0.7 0.56 0.56 0.66 0.54
 0.8 0.69 0.69 0.77 0.69
 0.9 0.84 0.84 0.89 0.84
Correlated votes based on federalization
 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.36 0.24
 0.6 0.37 0.37 0.49 0.34
 0.7 0.50 0.50 0.63 0.48
 0.8 0.65 0.65 0.77 0.65
 0.9 0.82 0.82 0.88 0.82
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the voting rules of the Council. As we may see, with the probability of positive 
votes rising and with correlated votes along any of the two dimensions analyzed 
here, the efficiency, i.e. the tendency towards a change of the status quo, grows. 
Second, the ideological positioning of EU governments seems to be a very relevant 
factor in practice, influencing the efficiency of decision-making in the Council, as 
correlated votes along this dimension raise the chances of legislation being adopted 
considerably.
5  Conclusions
Coleman’s index of the capacity to act is a helpful tool that assesses the decision 
efficiency of a committee, measuring the share of winning coalitions in all possible 
coalitions among committee members. By assessing the share of winning coalitions, 
it implicitly assumes that each committee member casts a positive vote on a bill with 
a probability of 0.5, and that the members’ votes are independent.
This paper demonstrates how Coleman’s index assesses decision efficiency for an 
institution such as the Council of the EU, in the framework of the EU-15, the EU-25, 
the EU-27 and EU-28.9 It also distinguishes between the effects of the triple major-
ity clause as introduced by the Treaty of Nice and the provisions incorporated into 
Lisbon Treaty. Respective calculations show that Council decision efficiency has 
rather strongly decreased since recent rounds of enlargement when assessed with 
Coleman’s index of the capacity of an institution to act, due to both the introduction 
of the more stringent (triple majority) decision of the Nice Treaty, and an increase 
in EU membership. By comparison, implementation of the provisions of the Lisbon 
Treaty will further increase the Council’s ‘capacity to act’.
It is somewhat puzzling that empirical accounts of Council decision-making do 
not find an enhanced status quo bias in Council voting behavior after the significant 
rounds of enlargement, whereas the theoretical assessments would expect a decrease 
in the frequency with which decisions in this institution can be taken. Calculations 
presented in this paper provide a possible answer to this puzzle. If the probability 
of committee members voting in favor of given policy proposals is higher than one-
half, the probability that the committee will reach decisions in formal votes strongly 
increases. In fact, if this probability is 0.9, the capacity of the institution to act is 
close to one, regardless of the voting rule. In other words, if the current ‘consensus 
culture’ within the Council of the EU continues to exist in the EU-28 as well as 
in a possibly further enlarged EU, predictions of the Council’s capacity based on 
homogeneity-adjusted calculations draw a more optimistic picture than traditional 
assessments based on Coleman’s index would. But even the homogeneity-adjusted 
calculations cannot reflect the decision-making and transaction costs that may occur 
as a result of possibly intensified bargaining and negotiation processes that precede 
actual decisions on proposals—usually made by consensus—in the Council of the 
9 The effectuation of Brexit will again change decision probability of the Council of the EU as will any 
other alternations in the composition of the EU’s current membership.
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EU. Hence, our paper modifies and extends earlier calculations and aims to provide 
a bridge between ‘theoretical’ assessments of Council voting efficiency, based on 
institutional provisions and decision rules, and the actual propensity of coalitions to 
form, based on ideological connectedness, in the framework of decision-making in 
the Council of the EU, leading to higher predictability in terms of de facto Council 
efficiency.
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